Invited speakers
Biography
Catarina Dutilh Novaes is a professor of philosophy and University Research Chair at VU Amsterdam, and Professorial Fellow at Arché, University of St. Andrews. She has worked on various topics through the years, including history of logic (especially Latin medieval logic), philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, argumentation theory, social epistemology, and philosophy of science. She is the author of, among others, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction, winner of the Lakatos Award in 2022.
Engaging rationality today
What is rationality?
Rationality is many things: there is no unique sense of rationality, as it depends on the goals of those involved in specific situations. Thus understood, I plea for an essentially pragmatic conception of rationality.
What does rationality rule out?
Contextually defined, rationality will rule out whatever course of action that runs counter the goals of agents (in specific situations).
How does your talk engage with rationality today?
My talk offers a more nuanced account of the notion of rational argumentation, one which takes into account power relations and the interests of those involved.
Abstract
Argumentation, between reason and power
Rational argumentation, understood as the exchange of reasons, facts and evidence to support claims, permeates many important spheres of human life: politics, science, law, education (among others). But how well arguments ‘work’ in these different domains is a matter of contention. Argument optimists believe that arguments can change minds, and in the right direction; wrong opinions are filtered out through discussion. Argument pessimists, by contrast, maintain that facts and evidence do not change minds on topics of significance (especially political, societal and moral questions), and that argumentation may instead lead to polarization and disinformation. What to make of these divergent assessments of the impact of arguments on our lives? In this talk, which is based on a book project that I am currently developing, I present an account of argumentative processes that investigates the conditions under which the exchange of arguments is likely to be fruitful, or else futile or even harmful. This means that, rather than considering only the actual exchanges, we must also look into what happens before argumentation occurs. Who is in a position to engage in argumentation with whom? How do we decide who to exchange arguments with, among different options? What is the role of trust in these processes? These are some of the questions I will address, thus offering a more realistic account of arguments in real-life situations than the available alternatives, in particular by incorporating the role of power relations in argumentative processes.
Biography
Owen Griffiths is a philosopher of logic and language. From September 2024, he will be Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge. His most significant publication to date is One True Logic, co-authored with Prof. A.C. Paseau and published by OUP in May 2022. He is the winner of a 2022 Pilkington Prize for outstanding teaching at the University of Cambridge.
Engaging rationality today
What is rationality?
Rationality, of the sort that my work considers, is about the relationship between logic and reasoning. To be rational, we certainly don’t want to reason in ways that clash with logic. But the exact nature of the norms that issue from logic is difficult and fascinating.
What does rationality rule out?
Rationality, again of the sort that concerns me, rules out contradictory beliefs. We ought not, for example, believe the premises of a valid argument and the negation of its conclusion.
How does your talk engage with rationality today?
My aim is to get clearer on the connection between rational belief and logic. I hope to connect topics from contemporary philosophical logic with those from theories of rational choice in order to gain some insight into both.
Abstract
Logic, reasoning and pluralism
Arguments of natural language are either valid or invalid. Logic attempts to capture these validity facts. Reasoning, on the other hand, is an activity we engage in. What is the relationship between the two? Logic places certain constraints on correct reasoning but the exact nature of these constraints is obscure. Our beliefs will have infinitely many logical consequences, for example, and we cannot believe them all. We will consider the sorts of principles that might connect logic with correct reasoning, especially reasoning about logics themselves, and argue that doing so provides support for monism about logical consequence. This is the view that there is one true logic.
Biography
Franca D’Agostini is an Italian philosopher. She is best known for her work on the divide between analytic and continental philosophy (Analitici e continentali 1997) and her engagement in public philosophy in defence of a dialectical conception of truth (Verità avvelenata 2010 and other writings). She has studied Philosophy at the University of Turin (degree cum laude and PhD), and has taught courses of Logic, Philosophy of Science, Theoretics, in various Universities. She currently teaches Logic and Argumentation Theory at the University of Milan. Her areas of specialization are: Philosophical Logic, Metaphysics, Meta-philosophy and History of the XX Century Philosophy. She is author of many articles in English and Italian published in prominent journals, and of 18 books, some of which have been translated in various languages. Among her books: Logica del nichilismo (2000), Disavventure della verità (2002), The Last Fumes. Nihilism and the Nature of Philosophical Concepts (2008), Paradossi (2009), Introduzione alla verità (2011), Menzogna (2012), Realismo? Una questione non controversa (2013). She has recently published (co-authored with Maurizio Ferrera) La verità al potere. Sei diritti aletici (Einaudi, 2019).
Engaging rationality today
What is rationality?
Socratic questions of the kind ‘what is…?’ cannot have true and exhaustive answers nowadays, but let’s keep to the most general and unoffensive definition:
Rationality (hereafter: R) is the disposition to reason and act on the basis of justified premises
What is ‘justification’? What do we mean by ‘disposition’? Here again we have controversial concepts, but in principle, the definition works as it tells us at least two things:
- that R is a reflective second-order thought, to have R you should have reasons (directions – justifying supports) inspiring your acting or believing.
- that R does not only regard the ‘theoretical’ or epistemic or logical sphere, (thinking, believing, reasoning) but also the ‘practical’ domain. So we speak of rational behaviour as well as of rational thought.
What does rationality rule out?
The answer is consequent. A rational behaviour is grounded on justified premises i.e. opinions that have been validated by actual experience, or previous knowledge. What is ruled out is only non-R: a non-R behaviour and reasoning is not grounded on a similar procedure.
This notion of R is anthropologically neutral. The kind of human being who is intended to justify the premises is not specified. If you keep to a homo oeconomicus, then a premise is justified in virtue of expected utility; if you have homo spiritualis, the justification will be in virtue of spiritual (transcendent) principles; if you have homo psychicus, then you will have emotional-empirical principles ruling actions and beliefs; if you have homo politicus, social opportunities (such as consensus) will be primary in grounding premises.
The proposed definition does not need to specify, or privilege one or another anthropological view. Maybe the species we call Anthropos includes all these options, and each individual may have more or less disposition towards one or another direction.
Marginal note
It has been said that a similar idea of ‘rationality’ captures the structural and not substantive aspects of rationality. Thus it would not be enough, since it does not explain why, in general, we prefer R-behaviours and opinions to non-R (the why-be-rational challenge).
Yes, the definition is not substantive. But in my view this is namely the mark of its good generality. Actually, one of the mainstream conceptions of R, at least since the middle of the last century, has been related to the homo oeconomicus, so the so called ‘instrumental reason’ has been favoured. The other principles (cultural, social, emotional) have been variously opposed. But the idea that homo oeconomicus is the ‘true human’ is still dominant.
In our definition, expected utility is not properly ruled out, but it simply works as only one of the principles ruling R-justifications. And interestingly enough, this R-conception does not rule out emotions, spiritual or social needs. For instance, attending Christian mass is not taken as ‘irrational’, as well as it is not ‘non-R’ to adopt behaviours that are justified by the rule of helping other people, sometimes against our direct interest.
How does your talk engage with rationality today?
Is it a too vague notion? I do not think so, because it helps us to focus on the only ‘substantive’ aspect of rationality, which is truth, more specifically, the need for truth of individuals and communities.
I propose a distinct anthropology: the idea of homo alethicus (from aletheia = truth). Or also the idea of humans as alethic animals, animals somehow forced to stipulate continual confrontations with being largely intended, with ‘things how they stand’ (as in Plato’s definition of ‘true’: ta onta legei os estin). If we keep to this, we have a different picture of the situation of R in our age, sometimes called ‘infocratic’, ‘digitalized’, ‘hyper-communicative’, etc.. And we have the title of my talk: the explosion of reason.
Explosion is a very simple phenomenon: the conceptual function we call ‘truth’ does not work anymore, since it is not able to exclude falsity or untrue, it loses its exclusionary properties, everything becomes true, and justified. The slogan sometimes taken as typical of postmodernism, ‘anything goes’, is an expression of exploded reason. But so it was also the sceptical principle of sophists, in the first experiment of democracy, that for any (true - justified) discourse, an equally (true-justified) discourse can be opposed. So there is a connection between explosion and democracy.
In my talk, I do not limit myself to describe this apparently ‘apocalyptic’ situation, but I try to give some ideas of the logic which still rules our reasoning and actions in the age of (apparently) exploded rationality. So I propose a picture of the survival of rationality despite its apparent explosion.
Abstract
The Logic of Exploded Reason: Hypotheses and Programs
In my contribution I move from an interpretation of current times in terms of "the explosion of reason". Explosion is intended in technical, logical sense, as an effect of the acceptance of contradictions within the framework of classical logic. The consequence is what has been called trivialism: a condition whereby everything is true, and so everything is contradictory (as for any ‘p’ true, ‘not p’ must be true too). Contemporary reason is inevitably submitted to a similar condition, since it is ruled by the inevitable (factual) liberalism of a hyper-communicative world.
Now the challenge is to explain how it happens that, despite this, we can (or believe we can) still reason, judge, make decisions. I begin by proposing some paradigmatic examples, and then suggest the first lines of the peculiar logic which leads rational thought and behaviour in a putatively exploded world. As I will show, it is a version of dialectical (Hegel-sympathetic) logic, with some relevant differences, partly due to the work of contemporary paraconsistent logicians.²
Biography
Engaging rationality today
What is rationality?
The notion of rationality is tied to the unique ability of human beings to communicate in a manner that enables us to consider perspectives other than our own. By engaging in polemical dialogue with our peers, we endorse commitments for our stances and challenge each other’s claims. This is accomplished by developing their implicit inferences and results in an enriched and sometimes transformed understanding of issues of common concern. While many animals communicate and use cognitive abilities to solve problems, human reasoning is distinctive by the use of discursive abilities to test, evaluate, and eventually reject beliefs. This practice enables us to discern the true from the false, the real from the illusory, and the objectively valid from the subjectively felt.
What does rationality rule out?
To establish a boundary between reason and unreason entails entering a highly contested terrain, fraught with ethical and political implications. One lesson from genealogical studies of relations between reason and unreason is that such boundaries are far from being immutable. Critically, judgments of irrationality may reveal more about the judges than the judged, since each society tends to reject as irrational any form of conduct and reasoning that deviates from the generally accepted set of norms. And yet, while an absolute and impenetrable boundary between rationality and irrationality may not exist, there are certainly more or less rational ways of engaging in polemical situations. These ways exist along a continuum, ranging from the ideal of acting as a fully consistent and responsive agent capable of decentralizing one’s own perspective, to the opposite extreme of resorting to mere coercion and refusing to engage with the opponent’s well-founded objections or substantial counter-evidence.
How does your talk engage with rationality today?
My talk addresses the contemporary debate surrounding the concept of "universal reason". While some defend universal reason as the sole guarantor of human rights across cultures and the main bulwark against the evils of relativism, skeptics argue that such claims are hegemonic and oppressive, symptomatic of an ethnocentrism that does not dare speak its name. In my view, while universalism is rightly criticized when it is used to impose the standards of one culture upon others, the universality of certain well-justified ideas deserves to be defended from a transcultural standpoint. Consequently, the pursuit of universality involves engaging in cross-cultural exchanges that allow all interlocutors to examine prejudices and other elements of dogmatism within their own tradition. This approach to rationality, influenced by fallibilism, recognizes that our supposedly universal ideas are provisionally valid if they prove their worth worldwide, even if their formulation remains contingent on local and historical contexts.
Abstract
The Paradoxes of Rationality: A Fallibilistic Account
The concept of rationality is replete with paradoxes: it aspires to universality yet remains context-dependent; it purports to be necessary structure of thought while evolving within contingent conditions; it endeavors to uncover truths applicable to all seekers, yet emerges through agonistic processes.
My fallibilistic perspective on rationality tries to account for these seemingly contradictory features as being part of its internal dynamics. As far as the human quest for truth is concerned, its rationality does not reside in furnishing infallible knowledge, based on apodictic evidences or timeless principles, but rather in the reciprocal criticism within the community of inquirers. The capacity to tell the truth from mistake, the reality from illusion is therefore a collective, polemical and ongoing, “self-correcting enterprise” (Sellars).
My contribution explores the similarities and differences between analytic pragmatism and French historical epistemology. Through this comparison, I'll argue that rationality should not be viewed as something handed down to us, as a sort of innate faculty, but rather as a task to be perpetuated through collective effort, as a requirement that we lay on each other. The historical trajectory of rationality and the transformation of its standards emerge from the perpetual attempts of human beings to overcome various forms of dogmatism revealed in the struggle with contemporary needs. Central to this inquiry is the question: What are the pressing challenges facing rationality today, and what kind of rational conduct is the most the most viable path to address them?
Biography
Alexandre Billon an associate professor at the University of Lille specialized in the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. He has been working on the subjective point of view, objectivity and the rationality of delusional beliefs
Engaging rationality today
What is rationality?
Optimizing the relationship between one's beliefs, experience and actions.
What does rationality rule out?
Irrationality
How does your talk engage with rationality today?
I argue that science denialism (eg. the flat earth theory) is not irrational.
Abstract
Titre : Making sense of science denialism
In “The Future of the Human Sciences,” Ted Chiang imagines a world where the sciences have become so complex that they can only be practiced by AI, and the “humanities” are reduced to the impossible hermeneutics of results whose justification and meaning largely elude us. In such a world, it is likely that some humans would distrust AI and seek to rebuild a science on a human scale - even if it were inadequate. In this talk, I argue that we can understand part of the current scientific denialism on this model. In our case, it is not the AI that has confiscated our knowledge, but the experts. And the revolt is not aimed at a takeover of the sciences by men (opposed to AI), but by the people (opposed to experts). After clarifying the relationships between scientific denialism and conspiracy theories, I review the most influential explanations of denialism. I argue that they are incomplete, and advocate the thesis of scientific denialism as a “democratic revolt”. Finally, I propose ways to respond to this revolt and save belief in science.
Biography
Engaging rationality today
What is rationality?
I have no a priori concerning how to define rationality, and will not anticipate any result following from our open debate. I do however assume that rationality must include some sense of realism, of context, and of history. It therefore includes some awareness of its own reappraisal.
What does rationality rule out?
It excludes any mathematical or universal lingua rationalis (Leibniz), and also excludes any decision making procedures originating in any legal code (which are limited to institutional instances). It also rules out the systematic use of algorithms, which may nonetheless be useful for characterizing the future, immediate agency, and information sharing. Assisted intelligence may also possibly be submitted to rationality in order to deal with unavoidable uncertainty.
How does your talk engage with rationality today?
My talk starts from an account of actual state of knowledge dispersion, where different forms of knowledge each have their own language and their own specific syntax, and where each one gives access to some part of reality, delineates a local truth, and induces some pragmatic agency. Rationality is in charge of common life according to its different, and nevertheless overlapping, domains. Hence, we borrow Wittgenstein's formula “Logic must take care of itself” and propose a modest and provisional rewriting: rationality must take care of itself. This implies that everyone should reappraise their own responsibility.
Abstract
Facing Diversity
Our talk will look at the theme from two points of view. First, we will reconsider the Western logical tradition from both a historical and an anthropological perspective. This will lead us to identify, as canonical logic, the implementation of changing language paradigms within a doubly articulated human language. Following Galileo, and the arithmetization of mathematics during the 19th century, calculability has been given priority. This implies a certain definition of algorithmic computation and information. This kind of logical framing of rationality required a new medium for its implementation (German: Darstellung). This is what led to the development of mathematical logic, a binary calculus, and more recently, to Turing machines, being a generic name for computation and a vehicle for information. Such developments have shown both their promise and their limits.
Second, this leads us to reappraise what is real and accessible, instead of focusing on truth and a propositional stance. However, the diverse moving configurations of what is real, in all their dimensions (sensorial, scientific, which includes the visually schematic, and political), resist unification.
Consequently, we are brought to a new conception of rationality, one that highlights the dialogical, debated, common world, without discarding local logics and how our contemporary diverse knowledges symbolize, nor overlooking how they have been symbolically, historically and anthropologically implemented. This requires focusing on the future as a way to balance our dedication to history and its preservation. Such a viewpoint implies a certain form of mental ecology and establishing a new form of paideia, which go hand in hand with planetary ecology.